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Abstract
There is growing recognition that machine learning (ML) exposes new
security and privacy vulnerabilities in software systems, yet the technical
community’s understanding of the nature and extent of these vulnerabil-
ities remains limited but expanding. In this talk, we explore the threat
model space of ML algorithms through the lens of Saltzer and Schroeder’s
principles for the design of secure computer systems. This characteriza-
tion of the threat space prompts an investigation of current and future
research directions. We structure our discussion around three of these
directions, which we believe are likely to lead to significant progress. The
first encompasses a spectrum of approaches to verification and admis-
sion control, which is a prerequisite to enable fail-safe defaults in machine
learning systems. The second seeks to design mechanisms for assembling
reliable records of compromise that would help understand the degree to
which vulnerabilities are exploited by adversaries, as well as favor psycho-
logical acceptability of machine learning applications. The third pursues
formal frameworks for security and privacy in machine learning, which we
argue should strive to align machine learning goals such as generalization
with security and privacy desiderata like robustness or privacy. Key in-
sights resulting from these three directions pursued both in the ML and
security communities are identified and the effectiveness of approaches are
related to structural elements of ML algorithms and the data used to train
them. We conclude by systematizing best practices in our community.
1 Introduction
Security and privacy research in machine learning seeks to identify the degree to
which learning-based systems are exposed to adversarial manipulation as well
∗This report summarizes the keynote presented by the author in October 2018 at AISec
(colocated with ACM CCS) on security and privacy in machine learning.
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as how their behavior can be more robust to such manipulations. In this talk,
we consider the security and privacy of machine learning (ML) systems rather
than the application of ML to solve existing security or privacy problems. In
essence, we derive insights from asking the question of how ML security and
privacy relates to traditional computer security and privacy.1
Just like traditional computer security, ML security shares similarities with
real-world security. As pointed out by Butler Lampson [20], no real-world sys-
tem is perfectly secure (e.g., it’s easy to break in someone’s house or forge their
credit card) and therefore real-world security is all about raising the threshold
for an attack to be successful so as to balance the cost of protection with the
cost of recovering from an attack. Computer security is no different.
In this presentation, we ask whether machine learning offers a novel paradigm
for building systems that reduces the need for this periodical reevaluation of pro-
tection and recovery costs. In other words, is machine learning also necessarily
subject to the arms race found in many areas of computer security? They are
indeed some important differences between ML models and traditional com-
puter systems. For instance, ensembling different learning systems is one of the
ways to improve ML security (e.g., having an ensemble of learners vote for a
prediction can make this prediction private) while combining computer systems
with different architectures or configurations introduces complexity that is gen-
erally harmful to traditional computer security (e.g., running different operating
system versions in a computer network).
A conjecture on the existence of systematic approaches to security and pri-
vacy in ML systems concludes this presentation. In particular, we emphasize
that such approaches, should they exist, must take care to align security and
privacy goals with ML goals such as generalization.
Note. This presentation is not intended to serve as a comprehensive review
of the field. In particular, we do not follow the classic presentation of this
field that opposes training time adversaries to those that operate at test time,
while taxonomizing attack goals under confidentiality, integrity or availability.
Interested readers are referred to existing surveys covering ML security and
privacy comprehensively through the lens of this classic threat model [30, 7].
2 Why study ML security and privacy?
Just like programs are built upon basic programming abstractions, almost all
machine learning algorithms were designed with the assumption that the model’s
training and test distributions are identical: points that the model will be de-
ployed on are sampled from the same distribution than the distribution of points
it was trained on. This assumption is valid for many successful applications of
ML (e.g., machine translation or playing the game of Go).
To understand how this assumption influenced the design of machine learning
algorithms, take a look at how current neural network classifiers are typically
1In the following, security is used to refer to both security and privacy.
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Figure 1: Example of a ML-based risk model for a medical insurance provider.
trained: i.e., a softmax combined with the cross-entropy loss. This loss makes
the implicit assumption that all training points are completely unambiguous
and should be classified with 100% confidence in the class that is indicated by
their label. For instance, Figure 1 depicts an example model that could be used
by a medical insurance provider to estimate the risk of issuing an insurance
policy to an individual. The model is trained making the assumption that all
individual will fall under one of the three categories: high risk of cancer, high
risk of diabetes or low risk. The softmax also contains exactly as many possible
outputs as were included in the training data. Hence, if the model is presented
with an input that does not belong to any of the classes it was trained on, it
will nevertheless be forced to make a prediction in at least one of the classes
it was trained on. Indeed, no process is put in place to verify inputs before
they are presented to a ML model. For instance, the risk model mentioned
above would be forced to make an erroneous prediction if presented with the
medical records of a patient who is nearsighted. In other words, we expect that
ML predictions come with guarantees of integrity (i.e., correctness) on inputs
whose integrity was itself not vouched for. Because these inputs should not be
classified by the model, it is unsurprising in hindsight that it does not classify
them accurately. This holds even if the model was perfectly learned, i.e. it
recovered the underlying data distribution.
As ML is increasingly applied to domains involving security or privacy
considerations (e.g., intrusion detection2, high-frequency trading [17], health-
care [12], ...), the assumption that training and test distributions are identical
does not hold anymore: adversaries will intentionally find inputs such as the
example described in the previous paragraph. In practice, adversaries may
attempt to find attack variants that evade intrustion detecion, manipulate the
inputs of high-frequency trading to cause them to issue disadvantageous transac-
tion orders, or inspect healthcare models to recover sensitive data. As economist
Goodhart once stated, “when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good
measure”. Here, we could derive that “when a model becomes a target, it starts
to be vulnerable.” This means that the model itself could be the subject of an
attack; or that it may be (a) presented with inputs that were manipulated dur-
ing training and (b) asked to make predictions on inputs that it was not trained
to predict on. Examples of such attacks have already been explored in the
literature: e.g., model inversion [13], data poisoning [6] or model evasion [5, 37].
2For instance, one could create a learning algorithm that models network behavior and
predicts whether a particular set of packets contain the payload of an attack or not.
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Importantly, potential misuses of learning-based systems are not limited to
the ML model itself but also the computer system hosting this model. In other
words, the security of a ML model can (1) be impacted by but (2) can also itself
impact the security of the system that is deploying this very ML model.
First, a ML model can only be as secure as the system that hosts it. This
boils down to establishing a trusted computing base. For instance, the confi-
dentiality of data analyzed by a ML model during training or inference could be
jeopardized by a side-channel on the accelerator (e.g, FPGA, GPU, TPU, etc...)
that runs the model. Without having the whole system in mind, it could also
be difficult to trace back the impact of training and test data on the model’s
behavior. This consideration, in many ways comparable to data provenance [9],
is important when thinking about accountability in the context of ML—given
that a number of attacks (e.g., poisoning, watermarking) attempt to modify the
model’s behavior without the defender’s knowledge. We will come back to this
issue later in our discussion of complete mediation and admission control. These
two points suggest that in cases when establishing what should be included in
the trusted computing base is difficult, a defense-in-depth approach to security
from a system-wide perspective will likely also be relevant for learning-based
systems.
Second, the security of a system deploying ML can also depend on the se-
curity of the ML model itself. For instance, some security properties such as
availability only make sense in the context of the entire system but may depend
on security properties of the ML component itself (e.g., integrity). Take the
example of a software defined network (SDN) controller that integrates a ML
model for intrusion detection. If the integrity of that intrusion detection model
cannot be guaranteed, the availability of the SDN controller and of the entire
network it manages may be affected as well.
3 Revisiting Saltzer and Schroeder’s principles
Having established the importance of security and privacy for machine learning,
we now compare ML security with traditional computer security. Specifically, we
analyze the security and privacy of machine learning systems through the lens
of Saltzer and Schroeder’s principles [35]. These principles, written largely in
the context of cryptography research, not only ensure that our comparison with
traditional computer security is systematic, but they also provide insights on
what ML security is missing to achieve the level of provable security guarantees
that cryptography does today. These 10 principles strive for simplicity and
restriction. Indeed, these two characteristics generally make a security design
less prone to error and easier to manage. This analysis leads us to identify three
directions for future research that we explore in the rest of the presentation.
Fail-safe defaults. Base access decisions on permission rather than exclu-
sion. A precise characterization of deviations from the intended learning and
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inference behaviors should help implement fail-safe defaults that prevent the
model from being exploited beyond its original purpose.
At test-time, a conceptually simple example would have the system not re-
veal model predictions when they are made with low confidence. This is not a
perfect mechanism in the sense that the adversary will likely be able to adapt
its attack strategy to the specific threshold used to specify the minimum confi-
dence needed, but it does increase the adversary’s cost. At training time, when
learning is performed in an online fashion, rather than applying the updates sys-
tematically after each point is received, one could build an analog of sandboxes
for ML. For each batch received, the defender computes an updated candidate
model and compares its performance on a holdout set of data to the current
model. If the change in performance is not too important, the candidate model
replaces the existing model. Otherwise, the candidate model and the corre-
sponding batch of data are discarded by default. This makes the adversary’s
cost higher by forcing them to introduce changes gradually.
Open design. The design of security mechanisms should not be secret. Ex-
isting ML research has already shown that obfuscation strategies that attempt
to conceal information from attackers only provide limited security benefits and
can be circumvented by motivated adversaries.
One could for instance imagine that crafting adversarial examples in a black-
box threat model (where the adversary does not have direct access to the model)
is more difficult than mounting the same attack in white-box settings. However,
that is rarely the case (i.e., the gains of having a secret design are quite limited
for security) because of two reasons. First, a model that is originally a black-box
may become a white-box later in the future. That is, an insider could leak the
model or an adversary with access to a device deploying the model could reverse-
engineer the device’ software to recover the model. Second, adversaries with
access to a black-box model’s predictions are able to extract a substitute model
(i.e., a local copy of the black-box model that is now accessible to the adversary)
that can be used to mount other attacks (e.g., find adversarial examples). This
extraction typically consists in sending carefully selected input queries to the
black-box model and observing its predictions. Using the substitute model to
find inputs that manipulate the black-box model then succeeds because we have
observed that different ML models often share a large subspace of their error
space: thus, attacks that the adversary finds on the extracted substitute model
are also likely to be effective on the black-box model.
Another related example is the one of gradient masking. In particular, in the
context of test-time attacks (e.g., adversarial examples), gradient masking [29]
is a class of defense techniques that manipulate a model’s gradients, which are
often essential to an adversary’s reconnaissance of the model while conducting
a test-time attack. While this closed-design strategy increases the adversary’s
cost, an adaptive adversary can circumvent such defenses [29, 4] (see Figure 2).
On the contrary, privacy mechanisms are for the most part designed to pro-
vide worst-case guarantees that hold regardless of the knowledge and capabilities
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Figure 2: Example of an attack that circumvents gradient masking. Learn-
ing models with adversarial training (i.e., injecting adversarial examples during
training) often results in gradient masking: the model’s gradients are no longer
informative to find adversarial examples with the attack that was used to train
the model. Yet, an adversary can adapt by considering the model whose gradi-
ents were masked as a black-box, and transfer adversarial examples found on a
different model whose gradients are not masked. This illustration visualizes the
loss of an adversarially trained model (vertical axis) on adversarial examples
computed by evaluating the attack directly on the adversarially trained model
or a different model. The origin corresponds to the unmodified test input x and
all other points (α, β) to x+αε1+βε2 where ε1 is the direction computed on the
adversarially trained model (right horizontal axis) and ε2 on the other model
(left horizontal axis). The attack is more successful (larger loss) when transfer-
ring adversarial examples found on the other model than it is when computing
the attack on the adversarially trained model directly. See [38] for more details.
of the adversary. This is the case of differentially private mechanisms.
Contributing to high standards of open design, the ML security and pri-
vacy community consistently releases open-source code through libraries like
CleverHans [27] and FoolBox [33] or repositories for individual papers.
Separation of privilege. Where feasible, a protection mechanism that re-
quires two keys to unlock is more robust and flexible than one that allows access
to the presenter of only a single key. While somewhat specific to the cryptog-
raphy research that motivated Saltzer and Schroeder’s principles, separation of
privilege is still applicable to ML and in particular distributed settings for ML.
One prominent framework implementing this separation of privilege is feder-
ated learning where rather than collecting data centrally, a ML model is built
by having clients compute model updates individually on their own data and
then aggregating these local updates only [23]. Another example is the ESA
6
architecture, where the encoding, shuffling and analysis steps provide privacy
in the data pipeline [8]. One can possibly involve multiple parties in order to
separate privileges (e.g., by having more than one entity responsible for shuf-
fling the data before it is analyzed by a third party). In a completely different
threat model, one could also envision using an ensemble of models trained on
independent data pipelines to reduce one’s exposure to poisoning attacks.
Work factor. Compare the cost of circumventing the mechanism with the
resources of a potential attacker. For instance, designing CAPTCHAs that
are difficult to solve for ML models makes little sense given the low cost of
human labor needed to solve large numbers of CAPTCHAs [24]. While early
ML security work on evasion attacks considered the cost expended by adversaries
when mounting attacks (e.g., in adversarial learning [22]), this consideration has
been absent of most recent efforts. This is most likely due to the surge of interest
in image classifiers, for which inputs are often quasi-instantly and arbitrarily
manipulated. However, domains like intrusion detection may require higher
per-attack costs if the adversary needs to adapt to evolving feature engineering
performed by the defender.
Generally speaking, the adversary’s work factor is also much lower when the
defender commits to an approach first and the adversary makes its move second.
For instance, it may be easier for defenders to remove backdoors inserted in ML
models than it is to reliably watermark a model before it is released. Water-
marking is an instance of poisoning where the defender intentionally poisons the
model to have it respond to a specific trigger of their choice. Potentially, this
could help the defender identify stolen copies of their model only by querying
them. While similar techniques allow an adversary to insert a backdoor in a
model, in the backdoor setting, the defender can manipulate the model once
the attacker has committed to it. Instead, in the watermarking setting, the de-
fender must commit first. While both settings may eventually result in an arms
race, the defender is advantaged in the case of backdoors whereas the attacker
is advantaged in the case of watermarking because it is currently often easier to
remove correlations that result from poisoning than it is to insert them robustly
(so long as the poisoned behavior is inserted outside of the training manifold).
Psychological acceptability. It is essential that the human interface be de-
signed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically apply the pro-
tection mechanisms correctly. This is particularly relevant to ML security given
that ML models (and in particular deep neural networks) are commonly de-
picted as being black-boxes.3 Here, the psychological acceptability of security
and privacy mechanisms will likely benefit from and be beneficial to other areas
of research directions like interpretability [21]. They share the goal of providing
an explanation—that is easily accepted by a human—for why a model accepts
or refuses to classify an input (e.g., because the model’s confidence is high or
low and the prediction likely to be respectively correct or incorrect).
3Whether that should be the case is the subject of another discussion.
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For instance, the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors approach [28] searches the train-
ing data for points whose internal representations are closest to the internal
representations of the test point being classified. These training points not only
contribute to explaining why the model is making a particular prediction, but
their label can also serve as a way to reliably estimate the uncertainty of the
prediction—which is useful to build a mechanism that rejects inputs manipu-
lated by adversaries, as described in the fail-safe paragraph previously.
Privacy mechanisms have long suffered from their complexity, which im-
pacted their psychological acceptability and deployment. However, recent pro-
posals like PATE [26] provide rigorous—yet presumably intuitive—guarantees.
The approach partitions a sensitive training dataset in order to independently
train an ensemble of ML models on each data partition. At test-time, the mod-
els are asked to predict by collectively voting for one of the possible labels. See
Figure 4 for a diagram of the approach. Thus, if a PATE ensemble correctly
classifies an input, it is because there is consensus among ML models trained
independently on different data partitions. This not only makes it easy to un-
derstand where the privacy guarantee comes from: any given training point has
a limited impact on the prediction made because it was used to train a single
teacher. Beyond the benefits to security, being able to explain a model’s pre-
diction also helps deploy ML in high-stake applications (e.g., healthcare) and
can provide insights about the data: low performance of a private ML model
on certain inputs may reveal the need to consider fairness.
Economy of mechanism. One should keep the design of security mecha-
nisms as simple and small as possible. Unfortunately, this is often difficult
because many security problems in ML relate to the methods that underlie
ML: because training objectives and algorithms rely on the assumption that
training and test distributions are identical, it is more difficult to design ro-
bust ML models without making significant changes to them. Nevertheless, the
principle still applies to ML security: for instance, when attention is given to
details, adversarial training can outperform many elaborate schemes for thwart-
ing norm-constrained adversarial examples. Beyond the reduced risk associated
with them, simple and concise security mechanisms are also more likely to en-
able open design and psychological acceptability (see above). In particular, it
is important to keep the interfaces of security modules simple to ensure that
they are used properly in conjunction with the rest of the system. For instance,
when designing the attack API for CleverHans, we found that it is important
to provide a simple and clear abstraction for ML model predictions: not do-
ing so otherwise often led to incorrect implementations (e.g., with numerical
instabilities).
Complete mediation. Every access to every object must be checked for au-
thority. This is relevant to ML security in several ways. First from a confiden-
tiality and privacy standpoint, it is key to enforce access control to the model
and its predictions. The model itself may constitute intellectual property [39] or
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the basis for more elaborate attacks that recover sensitive information analyzed
by the model during training [36, 10]. Second, recall the data provenance ques-
tion raised earlier. Complete mediation is also relevant to it: if the defender is
unable to verify the integrity of its training or test data, it potentially exposes
the model to poisoning, evasion or privacy attacks. It could also make it dif-
ficult to implement the failsafe defaults mentioned earlier. In both cases, the
defender’s task is to cope with data that is not from the distribution of interest,
i.e. distribution drifts. We come back to this later in Sections 4 and 5.
Least privilege. Every program and every user of the system should oper-
ate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete the job. Beyond the
system-wide considerations—which fall under the realm of traditional computer
security, the ML paradigm offers new ways to implement the least privilege
principle. For example, the entity serving a ML model may not be trusted with
access to the data which the model is inferring on. In this trust model, one
could leverage homomorphic encryption to guarantee that the test data and
predictions made by the model can be accessed only by the user who submitted
this test data for inference [15]. One could also imagine that a ML system would
lose access to its training dataset once it has been trained.
Least common mechanism. Minimize the amount of mechanisms common
to more than one user and depended on by all users. As mentioned previously,
training data for an application can often be collected from several sources with
varying degrees of integrity guarantees. For instance, a system may deploy
mechanisms specific to detect poisoning attacks on data collected from the In-
ternet or labeled by external operators, but data that was collected and labelled
by a trusted party may not need to go through this potentially expensive ver-
ification procedure. Similarly, different users may call for varying degrees of
privacy guarantees [2]: for example, a subset of patients may have opted-in to
contribute their data for research purposes in a medical application. Homo-
morphic and non-homomorphic variants of the same system could also be used
for data with varying confidentiality risks. Finally, if the defender is able to
build robust ML models that are expensive to run inference for, it may choose
to deploy these models to respond to queries which are untrusted and could be
adversarial examples, while queries from trusted users could be answered by a
less computationally intensive (or simply more accurate) but less robust model.
Compromise recording. It is sometimes suggested that mechanisms that re-
liably record that a compromise of information has occurred can be used in place
of elaborate mechanisms that completely prevent loss. Compromise recording
is particularly difficult for ML systems because the relationship between test
performance and training performance is poorly understood and limited formal
tools are available to analyze it. For instance, being able to identify training
points that resulted in a particular model prediction can serve as the basis for
evaluating how robust a model is to data poisoning (e.g., with influence func-
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tions [19]) or designing mechanisms that reject test inputs which are not part
of the expected training distribution (e.g., because they have limited support in
the training data [28]). In another example, it is currently unknown whether it
is possible to detect model extraction under certain constraints placed on the
adversary. This would reduce the need for complicated watermarking defenses,
that are likely to come at the expense of performance for the model’s expected
users. We come back to this in our discussion of ML auditing.
Three directions for future work emerge from this discussion of past efforts:
model assurance and admission control, auditing ML and the need for formal
security and privacy goals and frameworks that are better aligned with original
ML goals. We discuss each of these in the rest of the presentation.
4 Model assurance and admission control
Machine learning research has historically focused on providing and measuring
expected performance of the system. A typical proxy for generalization error
is to measure the accuracy of the model on test data. Instead, in security, we
would like to provide worst-case guarantees: among a set of attack strategies,
adversaries will always choose the one that benefits them the most. Practically
speaking, this requires that we shift from testing to verification. For instance,
we could measure how little a model memorizes specific training points (e.g.,
through metrics like exposure [10]) but this does not guarantee that the model
does not memorize any training point.
Unfortunately, formal verification techniques designed for programs do not
directly apply to ML systems and thus need to be adapted. At training time,
model assurance would eventually enable one to establish with confidence that
the ML system matches security requirements. At test time, admission control
would consist in deciding whether input-output pairs obtained from a sandboxed
execution of the model are admissible in the pool of answers. Both model
assurance and admission control require however that a security (in the broad
sense here, that also includes privacy) policy be specified.
Specifying privacy policies. Finding the right language for specifying se-
curity and privacy policies in ML systems is a prerequisite for model assurance
and admission control, yet it remains an open problem.
As far as security (e.g., integrity) is concerned, we have an informal way to
specify the desired requirements. For instance, we’d like the system to accu-
rately model exactly the task which it was designed to solve. This implies that
the system should be correctly implemented (e.g., not present any numerical in-
stabilities), solve the end task (e.g., make correct predictions on all valid inputs)
and only solve this end task (e.g, not present any backdoors or corrupted logic
resulting from data poisoning). However, it is unknown how to formalize this
intuitive set of requirements with precise semantics while avoiding ambiguity.
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In privacy, we have a much clearer picture where one can state both intu-
itively and rigorously what requirements a privacy-preserving ML system should
match. Intuitively, the system’s behavior should not reflect any personal infor-
mation included in the training dataset. Formally, one can use the framework
of differential privacy to specify this requirement [11].
We will come back to this discussion at the end of the talk but for now we
will assume that the security (and privacy) policy has been specified.
4.1 Model assurance at training time
Formal verification is a popular way of establishing security assurance, i.e.,
confidence that the system matches the security requirements stated.
Coverage in machine learning. Once security requirements have been es-
tablished, one obstacle that prevents the direct application of formal verification
techniques designed for programs is that they often rely on a notion of coverage.
Intuitively, coverage measures how much of the program’s logic was exercised
by the verification tool. A simple yet common coverage metric is the number of
lines executed by a verification program. This metric does not apply well to ML
because an inference pass through most modern implementations of ML models
will likely execute all of the program’s lines. In other words, the number of
lines executed does not reflect how much of the model’s logic has been verified
because a lot of the computations involved are defined as matrix computations.
To circumvent this limitation, a first approach introduced neural coverage as the
number of neurons whose activation is above a threshold [32]. Unfortunately,
this does not always completely reflect the logic learned by a model, which is
hardcoded by complex arrangements of multiple neurons. Another recent pro-
posal instead considers layer activations as a whole and measures the distance
between different activation vectors to measure progress [25]. Future work will
have to find the right abstractions for representing components of a neural net-
work’s logic, which will likely also help build more interpretable and robust
models. One could for instance ask how the dynamic routing of activity vectors
would help with identifying such logic elements in capsules networks [34].
In addition to covering the entire logic implemented by the system, it is
important to verify the entire set of valid inputs to the system. In ML this
can be more difficult than expected because this set is often poorly defined
and part of the motivation behind applying ML is to identify this manifold.
For instance, it is possible to define the set of images using a range of pixel
values but this is different from the manifold of natural images. This question
is important because verification tools often need a dataset to bootstrap an
heuristic. Finding datasets representative of the expected task distribution can
be hard and is necessary to avoid some of the pitfalls of testing.
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Figure 3: The Deep k-Nearest Neighbors estimates support in the training data
for a particular prediction through a nearest neighbors search over the internal
representation spaces. This serves as the basis for admission control of input-
output pairs based on the homogeneity of the support, which is a proxy for the
model’s uncertainty. See [28] for more details.
4.2 Test-time admission control of input-output pairs
In traditional access control, it is common to implement a reference monitor.
The reference monitor mediates all requests from sources to guard a specific
resource. In our case, the sources would be users, requests prediction queries
and the resource would be the ML model itself or its prediction. Queries that we
would like to reject include those that were crafted to have the model mispredict
(e.g., adversarial examples) but also those that are part of reconnaissance efforts
(e.g., model extraction) to mount other attacks.
However, because authentication is often weakly enforced when queries are
made to a ML model, as is the case for search engines, implementing a reference
monitor is difficult and admission control is essential to prevent adversaries from
exploiting vulnerabilities that were not addressed by model assurance. Indeed,
just like a program can be policy-compliant yet still have buffer overflows, one
could imagine that a ML model may still exhibit undesired behavior despite
passing model assurance. This could be the case if the security policy does not
apply to a zero-day attack. Hence, given an input and an output, we’d like to be
able to know whether we admit the input-output pair into our pool of answers.
This is difficult in ML because the underlying distribution is unknown.
In essence, we would like to verify that we only use the model on the in-
tended test distribution. One approach is to run the model in a sandbox and
analyze the input-output pair before revealing it to the user. For instance, if we
can define a well-calibrated estimate of the model’s uncertainty, we can admit
input-output pairs only if the model’s confidence is sufficiently high. Evaluating
12
these defense strategies necessarily involves a tradeoff between performance on
legitimate and adversarial inputs, as increasing the true positive rate (adversar-
ial examples marked as malicious) often undesirably increases the false positive
rate (legitimate inputs marked as malicious) [3]. Confidence is a difficult metric
to use because it can be manipulated by adversaries. For instance, in a modern
neural network, an adversary can typically modify the input to modify the mag-
nitude of the pre-softmax activations (i.e., logits) and thus arbitrarly control the
model’s confidence. This is because high confidence in a particular label only
suggests that the model believes that there are no other possible labels for the
given input based on the training data it has analyzed. However, this does not
mean the training data is relevant to classify this particular input.
Hence, estimating support in the training data when making a prediction can
serve as the basis for coming up with more reliable uncertainty estimates. This
is for instance the approach taken in the Deep k-Nearest Neighbors, depicted
in Figure 3, where support from the training data is evaluated by searching
for training points whose internal representations are closest to the ones of the
test input being classified [28]. The labels of these nearest training points is
then analyzed: when they are homogeneously supporting the predicted label,
uncertainty in the prediction is low; instead, when there are several different
labels in the nearest training data, uncertainty is high. Note that characterizing
support from the training data also has the benefit of informing active learning
procedures: when weak support is identified for a particular input, this can
be prioritized in the labeling strategy. Other approaches that seek to provide
reliable uncertainty estimates include Bayesian deep learning [18].
5 Towards Auditing ML
As is the case for search engines or spam filtering—where authentication and au-
thorization are weakly enforced, auditing will likely be an important component
of ML security [20, 16]. The two components of auditing—better compromise
recording and a posteriori analysis of these logs—would partly alleviate incom-
plete assurance through the identification of threats both proactively and reac-
tively. Specifically, it may help with increasing the work factor of adversaries
that wish to go undetected as well as improve the psychological acceptability of
ML security mechanisms if a complete record of compromise is achieved. Com-
bined with techniques like sandboxing, auditing may improve the security of
ML systems in an manner orthogonal to other security-related efforts.
The first step towards designing an audit system is to identify which infor-
mation should be logged and analyzed. This decision should be made in light
of the security requirements, which inform the process of identifying all of the
information that is relevant to detect and analyze malicious behavior that vi-
olates the security policy. An analyzer capable of deducing violations of the
security policy then parses the information contained in these logs.
Designing auditing systems for ML is still largely an open problem. Hence,
in the following we give examples where auditing would improve how practical
13
Figure 4: Example auditing of a learning algorithm’s privacy properties. The
moments accountant not only analyzes the votes of teachers for each training
label given to the student, the privacy analyzer also breaks down privacy ex-
penditure by components of the overall approach. See [31] for more details.
attacks against learning or inference are handled and what information could
be collected in logs for that purpose.
Auditing the learning algorithm. Some forms of auditing systems exist
in the privacy realm, most likely because the security requirements are rig-
orously formalized within the framework of differential privacy. For instance,
the moments accountant [1] can be seen as an analyzer for logs produced by
privacy-preserving algorithms like DPSGD or PATE. The moments accountant
performs data dependent analysis to estimate whether the privacy budget was
exceeded and reports these results to the user training the model. In the exam-
ple of PATE, the histograms of teacher votes are saved for each aggregated label
returned to the student. This logging is performed during training. Once the
student is done training, the moments accountant can analyze these logs and
give insights on how the privacy budget was spent during training (see Figure 4).
Auditing the inference algorithm. Techniques that characterize the rela-
tionship between train and test behavior are likely to produce useful information
to collect when auditing a learner during inference. In the context of privacy,
logging user queries made for points that are exactly found in the training data
(or very close to training data) could be the basis for an analyzer that iden-
tifies membership inference attacks if a large number of such queries is logged
within a small time window. In some ways, watermarking could be the basis for
collecting logs of model predictions made beyond the intended deployment sys-
tems and for instance detect model theft (assuming the defender has the ability
to monitor the systems potentially hosting stolen copies of the model). More
generally, making it more difficult for adversaries to perform the reconnaissance
14
necessary to reverse engineer and extract models is a strong use case for audit-
ing. However, it is unclear at this point how one could distinguish queries made
during reconnaissance from legitimate user queries.
Obviously, logs collected to support auditing will be targeted by adversaries.
It is important to insure they are tamperproof. This however falls under the
realm of traditional integrity consideration and is not specific to ML.
6 Formal frameworks that align ML goals with
security and privacy goals
Previously, we left the discussion of formal specifications of security and privacy
policies on the side. However, precise definitions of policies are a prerequisite
for model assurance, admission control and auditing.
A comparison with cryptography. Cryptography made a lot of progress
once the security game (which includes the adversary’s capabilities and goals)
was identified and defined formally. For instance, if we look at protocols and
how they evolved from SSL, to TLS 1.0, 1.2 and recently 1.3, it is clear that
the increasing use of scientific thinking, provable guarantees, formal analysis
and hard mathematical reasoning was beneficial to the security of the TLS 1.3
protocol. One differentiating characteristic of cryptographic systems is that they
are—for the most part—expressed mathematically. This facilitates the formal
analysis of their security properties. However, a large part of ML architectures
and algorithms can also be expressed mathematically. Hence, we ask here:
are ML systems more amenable to formal specification of security and privacy
goals than traditional computer systems because a large part of the system can
be expressed mathematically? One caveat that may prevent us from answering
this question positively lies in the lack of precise generalization bounds between
training and test-time performance.
Differential privacy. A great example of a formal framework that supports
both intuitive and rigorous specifications of a policy is differential privacy [11].
Intuitively, an algorithm is differentially private if its behavior is indistinguish-
able to an adversary regardless of the fact that any of the individual data points
were included or not. This can be expressed formally. Indeed an algorithm M
(here, this would be a learning algorithm) is said to be differentially private if
for any neighboring datasets d and d′ (that is, they have a Hamming distance
of 1) and any possible output S, the following holds:
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr[M(d′) ∈ S]
Here, the strength of the privacy protection is measured by ε: smaller values of
ε correspond to stronger privacy guarantees.
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In addition to not making any assumptions about the adversary (which
means it holds in the face of new attacks that may be discovered in the future),
differential privacy is great because it aligns worst-case privacy guarantees with
average-case generalization. For instance, in follow-up work on PATE, we found
that we could make a simple modification to how individual teacher votes are ag-
gregated, which results in simultaneous improvements to both the accuracy and
the privacy of the approach. Specifically, we explicitly required the consensus
among teachers to be very high before revealing the corresponding aggregated
label to the student (note how this recalls the fail-safe defaults principle dis-
cussed earlier). First, we found that this improves the mean accuracy of labels
presented to the student, and as a consequence the accuracy of the student it-
self: if the consensus among teachers in the ensemble is high, the label is more
likely to be correct. Second, this also reduced the overall privacy budget spent
to create these labels because each label is very cheap in terms of privacy: it is
very unlikely for a single teacher to change the outcome of aggregation.
Towards a similar framework for security. If we’d like to define a similar
framework for security, we’ll have to answer the following questions:
• Should guarantees be formulated with respect to the training data, algo-
rithm or both? Differential privacy is a property of the algorithm and
not of the data. Yet, it may make sense to include the data in a security
policy: for instance, it is likely harder to train a robust model on a dataset
that is not linearly separable than on a dataset that is linearly separable.
• Should the framework encompass training and test time adversaries? One
argument in favor of including both in a unified framework is that it would
allow us to consider dynamics between training-time attacks and test-time
attacks: for instance, how does defending against adversarial examples
impact robustness to poisoning attacks? These dynamics have been fairly
unexplored by our community so far.
• How can we provide domain-agnostic formalism? There has been a lot of
attention to vision classifiers in our field over the past few years. This led
us to define adversaries using formulations that only make sense in the
image domain (e.g., `p-norm based constraints on input perturbations).
Considering other domains both in our work and in efforts to formulate
security policies will thus likely lead to additional insights and more fun-
damental definitions of robustness in machine learning.
7 Conclusions
The main takeaways from this presentation are the following three points:
• Efforts need to specify ML security and privacy policies. What
is the right abstraction and language to formalize security and privacy
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requirements with precise semantics and no ambiguity? In particular, we
did not discuss how writing security policies for ML systems is different
(or not?) from writing security policies for classic computer programs
and systems. There is usually a difficult tradeoff between writing policies
in sufficiently abstract languages for humans to understand them but at
the same time in a sufficiently low abstraction that machines can also
understand. This is particularly important if we don’t understand how
the predictions or learning happens.
• Admission control and auditing may address lack of assurance.
Future work should consider how sandboxing, input-output admission con-
trol and compromise recording help secure ML systems when data prove-
nance and assurance is hard.
• Security and privacy should strive to align with ML goals. While
formulating the security and privacy requirements, we should take partic-
ular care in thinking how they relate to important ML goals. For instance:
how do private learning and robust learning relate to generalization? how
does poisoning relate to learning from noisy data or distribution drifts?
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